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Comment
A MISUSE OF STATISTICS AND FUTURE DAMAGES
-I. INTRODUCTION
An injured party may generally recover damages for various
types of personal injuries in tort litigation. In particular, a plain-
tiff is allowed to recover for damages reasonably expected in the
future.1 This comment is concerned primarily with the use of
statistics in calculating future earning capacity, but it will also
examine other problems encountered in attempting to measure
prospective damages.2 Initially, the comment will outline and
criticize the mechanics involved in the application of the "present
approach." Then it will analyze the use of statistics and will
note that the present formula used in calculating future dam-
ages leads to a consistent overstatement of damages. Finally, the
comment will offer alternative approaches that will hopefully avoid
the shortcomings of the "present approach."
II. PRESENT APPROACH
A. GENERALLY
Before analyzing the use of statistics in detail it is necessary
to briefly note some general characteristics and weaknesses of the
present approach to the calculation of damages.
First, and most important to this comment, is the requirement
that all damages, past, present and prospective, be awarded to a
plaintiff in one lump sum. This requirement necessitates the de-
fendant tendering one payment to a plaintiff for all damages result-
1 Washington & Georgetown M.R. v. Harmon's Adm'r, 147 U.S. 571, 584(1893): "[T]here was evidence which justified a finding that future
damages would inevitably and necessarily result, and this being so
there was error in the instruction upon that subject." See also Pea-
cock v. Brandeis and Sons, 157 Neb. 514, 525, 60 N.W.2d 643, 650(1953): "In arriving at the amount of plaintiff's damage the jury
was required to take into consideration, as instructed, the character
of the injury, pain, suffering, and loss already sustained, the reason-
able value of medical care entailed or required up to the time of the
trial, and also what in these respects would be entailed or required
in the future as a consequence of the accident and injury."
2 The courts have held that a plaintiff is entitled to an award for the
future effect of his injury. In Detroit Taxicab and Transfer v. Pratt,
2 F.2d 193, 194 (6th Cir. 1924), it was held that "[a] person injured
by the negligence of another is entitled to an award for the future
effect of his injury, the amount thereof to be estimated by the jury
and included in its verdict."
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ing from the defendant's negligence.3 It further makes it necessary
for the legal system to devise some sort of procedure to calculate
future damages since the defendant is required to compensate for
the future effects of his negligent behavior. Although the "lump
sum" doctrine has been criticized as capricious and inflexible,
4 it
nevertheless has been applied in American courts almost 5 without
exception.
Further, damages are typically awarded by the same jury that
establishes liability. This procedure has raised some questions re-
lated to the accuracy of amounts awarded in such a fashion. The
traditional assessment gives rise to the problem of the jury con-
sidering the "degree" of defendant's negligence against the amount
to be awarded plaintiff.6 Where such a weighing occurs the
amount of the award no longer reflects the actual damages sustained
and expected, but rather the culpability of the defendant. Also, the
jury is not generally allowed to consider the effect of probable
income taxes,7 attorney fees8 or insurance9 upon the damage award.
3 See generally Slater v. National Mexican Ry., 194 U.S. 120 (1904)
(dictum).
4 "The jury almost always is asked to reach decision on imperfect, in-
complete and conflicting evidence .... This ambiguity . . . greatly
increases the jury's freedom and affords them the chance to use their
special equities, but it also disturbs them to decide so much of a
man's future fate. And more than one jury has been puzzled as to
why the future cannot be left in the custody of the court to be ad-
justed as the future events require much in the fashion of alimony
payments." Kalven, The Jury, the Law and the Personal Injury
Damage Award, 19 Omio ST. L.J. 158, 165 (1958).
5 In M. & P. Stores, Inc. v. Taylor, 326 P.2d 804, 808-09 (Okla. 1958),
the court allowed a lump sum of $36,000 to be paid in installments
saying that "[t]he verdict should not have been rendered in this form
and should not have been received in this form. However, it was
received and neither party objected to it and neither party now con-
tends that the verdict was void, and under these circumstances this
court will not of its own volition invalidate it."
6 In Fuentes v. Tucker, 31 Cal. 2d 1, 187 P.2d 752 (1947) (concurring
opinion), Judge Carter discussed the human tendency of weighing
liability against culpability in arriving at damages to be awarded.
7 Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Curl, 178 F.2d 497 (8th Cir. 1949); Plant v.
Simon Co., 321 F. Supp. 735 (D. Md. 1970); Hall v. Chicago & N.W.
Ry., 5 Ill. 2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77 (1955); Briggs v. Chicago Great W.
Ry., 248 Minn. 418, 80 N.W.2d 625 (1957); Dempsey v. Thompson, 363
Mo. 339, 251 S.W.2d 42 (1952). But see Floyd v. Fruit Industries, Inc.,
144 Conn. 659, 136 A.2d 918 (1957) (In a wrongful death action evi-
dence as to the effect of income taxes was properly admitted.)
8 McWeeney v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Ry., 282 F.2d 34 (2d
Cir. 1960); C. McCovrMcK, DAMAGES § 71 (1935).
9 See Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort
Law, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 1478 (1966).
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Furthermore, while the use of expert testimony is allowed to aid
the jury in calculating prospective harm, the courts have been quick
to restrict such testimony where it invades the province of thejury. 0
Finally, there are only certain types of harm that are qualified
for compensation." Where the future damages are concerned 12 the
courts generally allow recovery for future pain and suffering rea-
sonably expected,13 the future medical care expected 4 and the
value of time and earnings reasonably certain to be lost in the
future. The Nebraska Supreme Court has said:
In computing the damages for personal injuries resulting from
loss of future earning capacity allowance should be made for the
earning power of money and when the loss of future earnings are
considered the jury should take into account the present value of
the future earnings which it finds the claimant has, by reason of his
10 The actuary demonstrating the proper method of calculation is gen-
erally not allowed to use figures pertinent to the plaintiffs situation.
Instead the actuary must use neutral figures. See Allendorf v. Elgin,
Joliet & Eastern Ry., 8 Ill. 2d 164, 177-78, 133 N.E.2d 288, 294-95(1956): "To allow an actuary to testify to figures, which the jury
might adopt as real, carries with it the danger that the jury will
accept them not only as the actuary's explanation of the process of
computation, but also as proof .... We are of the opinion that the
proper method for assisting a jury in making damage calculations is
for the actuary to use neutral figures."
11 Several courts have permitted the loss of enjoyment of life to be
considered as a factor in determining damages. See generally Dallas
& Mavis Forwarding Co. v. Liddell, 126 Ind. App. 113, 126 N.E.2d 18
(1955); McAlister v. Carl, 233 Md. 446, 197 A.2d 140 (1964); Baker
v. Manhatten R.R., 118 N.Y. 533, 23 N.E. 885 (1890).
12 Generally the courts require that adequate evidence be presented to
show that future harm will result before allowing recovery. See gen-
erally Mendoza v. Rudolf, 140 Cal. App. 2d 633, 295 P.2d 445 (1956)
(pain and suffering); Pueblo v. Ratliff, 131 Colo. 381, 281 P.2d 1021(1955); Seymour v. House, 305 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1957) (earning ca-
pacity); Herndon v. Crawford, 174 Neb. 618, 119 N.W.2d 82 (1963)(pain and suffering); Connolly v. Philadelphia Trans. Co., 420 Pa. 280,
216 A.2d 60 (1966) (pain and suffering); Lundquist v. Western Casu-
alty Co., 30 Wis. 2d 159, 140 N.W.2d 241 (1966) (earning capacity).
'3 Husak v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 165 Neb. 537, 86 N.W.2d 604 (1957)
(plaintiff can recover for future pain and suffering reasonably ex-
pected to occur); See also Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Candler, 283 F. 881
(8th Cir. 1922) (allowance for future pain and suffering not restricted
to present value).
14 See generally F. W. Woolworth Co. V. Seckinger, 125 F.2d 97 (5th Cir.
1942); Seeing Denver Co. v. Morgan, 66 Colo. 565, 185 P. 339 (1919);
Steele v. Brown, 43 Ill. App. 2d 293, 193 N.E.2d 352 (1963); Helman
v. Sacred Heart Hospital, 62 Wash. 2d 136, 381 P.2d 605 (1963).
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injuries, been deprived, that is, the damage for future loss of earn-
ing power is the amount thereof reduced to its present worth.15
Although the above description is rather abbreviated it does
demonstrate some of the problems with the present approach. Very
simply, the procedures adopted by the courts are likely to impede
an accurate estimation of damages.
B. A TypicAL CALCULATION
Clearly the legal system's requirement that damages, past, pres-
ent and prospective, be awarded in a lump sum payment 16 has made
it necessary for the courts to estimate the amount of future damage
that a plaintiff may sustain. This entails a certain amount of clair-
voyance on the part of the legal system 17 but, fortunately, the
courts have avoided a dependence upon the supernatural for such
determination and have instead relied upon evidence of a more
scientific nature to arrive at an estimate of future damages. This
reliance reflects the courts' continuing policy of divorcing them-
selves from mere speculation in the assessment of damages, and
requiring a basis upon which to calculate compensation. 9 In par-
ticular, where future income is concerned the courts have stressed
the use of life-expectancy tables20 and data concerning wages and
interest rates.
The formula that the courts have devised 2' in ascertaining future
income basically involves instructing the jury to estimate the life-
15 Borcherding v. Eklund, 156 Neb. 196, 207, 55 N.W.2d 643, 650-51 (1952).
16 Note 3 supra.
17 Note 4 supra.
18 Borcherding v. Eklund, 156 Neb. 196, 209, 55 N.W.2d 643, 651 (1952):
"A jury should be fully and fairly informed as to the various items of
damages which it should take into consideration in arriving at its
verdict. In this respect it is the duty of the trial court to instruct as
to the proper basis upon which damages are to be assessed for each
such item.
19 Benedict v. Eppley Hotel Co., 159 Neb. 23, 32, 65 N.W.2d 224, 230
(1954): "The jury was not advised as to any basis upon which damages
could be assessed by it. This omission is plain prejudicial error."
20 The courts have generally required that a plaintiff show that he is
permanently injured before admitting life tables. See generally Fogel
v. Sinai Hospital, 2 Mich. App. 99, 138 N.W.2d 503 (1965); Zager v.
Johnson, 174 Neb. 106, 116 N.W.2d 1 (1962); Welstead v. Jim Ryan
Constr. Co., 160 Neb. 87, 69 N.W.2d 308 (1955); Dominquez v. Albu-
querque Bus Co., 58 N.M. 562, 273 P.2d 756 (1954); Kappovich v. Le
Winter, 43 N.J. Super. 528, 129 A.2d 299 (1957).
21 "Consequently, if the jury finds, by the use of the life tables and other
evidence, that the plaintiff's probable life expectancy is twenty years,
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expectancy of the plaintiff prior to the accident, to multiply that
amount by the annual loss expected, and to reduce that product
to present value.
In computing the damages arising in the future (because of loss
of ... earnings) you must not simply multiply the damages (by
the number of years you have found that the plaintiff is likely to
live). Instead, you must determine their present cash value.22
The use of this formula does give the jury some guidance for
its task, but in application the formula does have certain defi-
ciencies.
1. Life Expectancy
While an average jury may have some knowledge concerning
life expectancy, it certainly would seem prudent to provide the
jury with pertinent statistics to guide them in their estimation.
Recognizing this doctrine, the courts have generally allowed stand-
ard life expectancy tables to be admitted as evidence in tort litiga-
tion.23 However, the courts have been exceedingly lax in screening
improper measurements and have allowed outdated and inappro-
priate tables to be considered by the jury when more relevant data
is readily available.
For instance, a Georgia court, as recently as 1970, has sanctioned
the use of the Carlisle Life Expectancy Tables in a personal injury
action.24 The Carlisle Tables were published in 1815 by Joshua
Milne from a record of approximately 2,000 deaths in the town of
Carlisle, Scotland during the period from 1779 to 1787.25 While the
tables may have accurately represented mortality rates in eigh-
teenth century Scotland, one certainly questions their relevance to
this country in the twentieth century. Moreover, when one con-
and that by reason of his injury, his earning power will be lessened
by an average amount of $1,000 per year, they can then resort to an
annuity table, which will show that, at 6 per cent, the present worth
of an annuity of $1 for twenty years is $11.469. Multiplying by 1,000,
the result is an award of $11,469." C. McCoRMucK, DAMAGES § 86, at
305 (1935).
22 NEB. PATTERN JURY INSTR. § 4.12 (1969).
23 See note 20 supra.
24 Crowe v. Harrell, 122 Ga. App. 7, 176 S.E.2d 190 (1970). The Ne-
braska courts have likewise held the Carlisle table admissible. Lyons
v. Joseph, 124 Neb. 442, 246 N.W. 859 (1933).
25 See NELsoN & WARREN, PRINCIPLE MORTALITY TABLES OLD AND NEW
52.
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siders that more relevant mortality data is available, the use of
such outdated tables seems inexcusable. 26
Further, the courts have failed to recognize that life expectancy
tables are generally accumulated from groups of people having a
wide divergence of characteristics that will influence mortality.
For example, where a court is dealing with a male plaintiff, one
can readily observe that the application of a life expectancy table
that includes females will not accurately reflect the mortality of the
male plaintiff since females, on the average, live longer than males.2 T
In conclusion, it seems ridiculous for the courts on the one hand
to advocate an objective basis for calculation and on the other hand
to permit the use of outdated and inapplicable data to form that
basis.
2. Annual loss expected
After estimating life expectancy the jury is then instructed to
determine an annual loss that plaintiff is expected to suffer. Gen-
erally, the jury will calculate the loss of earning capacity expected
every year as a result of the injury. Although the jury is instructed
to consider information concerning the plaintiff's personal expecta-
tions in his skill or trade, often the jury is not given adequate
data upon which to decide. Certainly publications related to trends
and future earnings in various occupations are available and would
be valuable to the jury.28
3. Present value
After the jury has determined life expectancy and expected
annual loss, the jury must then reduce that value to a present
value.29
26 1964 PERS. INJURY ANN. 915 (new life tables available through the
National Center for Health Statistics, Department of Health, Educa-
tion and Welfare).
27 See Hayes, Use of Mortality Tables in Tort Actions, 32 Wis. B. BULL.,
June 1959, at 27; Frumer & Biskind, Some Observations on Mortality
and Similar Tables and Actuarial Testimony, 1963 PF-s. INJuRY ANN.
796.
28 See Leonard, Future Economic Value in Wrongful Death Litigation,
30 Omo ST. L.J. 502 (1969).
29 In Nebraska, the question of whether or not the failure to instruct
the jury to reduce future damages to present value is a reversible
error, where defendant has not requested a specific instruction, hasbeen dealt with erratically. See Chambers v. Chicago, Burlington &Quincy R.R., 138 Neb. 490, 293 N.W. 338 (1940) (held not reversible
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In the attempt to measure future loss of earning capacity in
dollars, to be paid now, it is clear that it will not do for the jury
simply to estimate all the future wages that would have been
earned ... and to award the resulting sum. This would be more
than compensation, for it would enable the plaintiff to get his future
wages long in advance and to reap interest upon the money during
the intervening period .... What must be done, of course, is to
ascertain the "present worth" of each of the future installments of
lost earnings, and the award should equal the total of these sums.
To do this in detail would be difficult and tedious, and no jury
would attempt it, unless one of its members were an accountant.
A more practicable plan is to resort to tables known as "annuity
tables" or tables of present worth. These tables, calculated at various
rates of interest, show the present worth of a succession of annual
payments of $1 each for any given number of years.30
Of course, the pertinent parameter here is the applicable interest
rate. Again the court should give the jury guidance in the form
of data and expert investment counseling to help them arrive at
a discount rate.3 '
I. THEORETICAL ERROR
Certainly the formula outlined above does give the jury a basis
for determining future damages related to income. Although it does
have various shortcomings in its application by the courts, the
failures can be remedied if the courts are alert to inappropriate
data and the need for expert guidance. However, beyond the defi-
ciencies in the application of the formula, there is also a theoretical
error in the formula itself which leads to a consistent overstate-
ment of expected damages.32
While the present formula is believed by laymen to be accurate,
statistical and actuarial science demonstrates the shortcomings of
the approach. The laymen's mistaken belief results from the failure
error); Borcherding v. Eklund, 156 Neb. 196, 55 N.W.2d 643 (1952)
(held reversible error); Wolfe v. Mendel, 165 Neb. 16, 84 N.W.2d 109
(1957) (held not reversible error); Zawada v. Anderson, 181 Neb. 467,
149 N.W.2d 329 (1967) (held not reversible error). See also NEB.
PATTmN JURY INSTR. § 4.13 (1969) (present cash value).
30 C. McCoRMvcK, DAMAGES § 86 (1935); Healey, Reduction of Damages
For Loss of Future Earnings to Present Worth, 32 NEB. L. REV. 583
(1953) (use of simple interest is more complicated for jury than
use of present worth tables).
31 See Langerman, Reducing Personal Injury Damages to Present Value,
15 PRAc. LAw., May 1969, at 53; Leasure, How to Prove Reduction to
Present Worth, 21 OmO ST. L.J. 204 (1960).
32 See C. JORDAN, LIFE CoNTnNGxciEs (2d ed. 1967); 1 D. KEMP, M.
KEMP & R. HAVERY, THE QUANTUM OF DAMAGES IN PERSONAL INJURY
CLAI s 24-61 (3d ed. 1967).
670 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 51, NO. 4 (1972)
to distinguish between an annuity certain and an annuity for life.33
The present approach to the calculation of future income, by imple-
menting life expectancy tables with a reduction to present value,
awards the plaintiff with an annuity certain. A more accurate
estimation of future earnings would be to award the injured plaintiff
with an annuity for life.34
In order to ascertain the value of a life annuity, actuaries use
commutation tables.35 The tables simply show the present value of
a one dollar annuity for the remainder of life at various ages.36
More precisely, the commutation table tabulates the probability
of a person dying each successive year, multiplies those values by
the present value of an annuity certain for each year, and adds
those values to produce a payment. The payment is the annuity
for life.37 Commutation tables are not completely foreign to tort
litigation and have been used for calculating future damages. 38
Few courts have understood the significance of the tables and have
summarily described them as a combination of a life expectancy
and present value table, implying that the two are equivalent.39 In
contrast, the value of a life annuity is always less than an annuity
certain.40 The present value of a life annuity is dependent upon
both interest and mortality. In computing the value by the "com-
mutation table" approach, both interest and mortality are taken
into consideration simultaneously. The present approach considers
first the life expectancy, which is dependent upon mortality only,
and subsequently considers the value of an annuity certain which
is dependent upon interest. Computing the damages by this two
step approach will always lead to a higher value than if both
interest and mortality are considered in one step. The annuity
certain method simply places too much emphasis on the effect of
interest during later years as compared to the life annuity method.4 1
33 See generally W. MENGE & C. FISCHER, THE MATHEMATICS OF LIFE
INSURANCE, 20-45 (2d ed. 1965).
34 C. JORDAN, supra note 32 at 174-75.
35 See C. JORDAN, supra note 32; W. MENGE & C. FISCHER, supra note 33,
at 27-30.
36 See W. MENGE & C. FISCHER, supra note 33, at 147-47.
37 See generally C. JORDAN, supra note 32.
38 1 WYo. STAT. ANN. 587 (1957).
39 The error is a result of the legal system's ignorance in the area of
actuary science. See C. JORDAN, supra note 32. The theory that the
commutation table is equivalent to the life expectancy, reduction to
present value process is implied by McCormick. See C. McCoaMcx,
DAMAGES § 86, at 305 (1935): "The process is simplified by the use
of tables, which are combined life expectancy and annuity tables...."
40 See note 33 supra.
41 Id.
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In order to more fully understand the differences in the two
approaches, consider the following hypothetical table:
A B C D
0-1 .3 $1.00 .30
1-2 .4 $1.95 .78
2-3 .3 $2.86 .86
$1.94
The first column, A, indicates the time in years involved; the
second column, B, indicates the chances for death (here there is a
100% probability of death in the 3 year period); the third column,
C, indicates the present value of a dollar awarded at the beginning
of each time period involved,42 and the fourth column, D, simply
multiplies column B by column C and adds the products.
After a cursory examination of the table, one will recognize
that the present approach used by the courts would result in an
award in multiples of $1.95. This follows since the life expectancy
shown by the hypothetical data would indicate death in the 1-2
year range. The present value of a dollar annuity certain for this
period is indicated as $1.95.
The commutation approach would take into consideration the
probabilities of death in the other years and would result in an
award in multiples of $1.94, which is less than the "life expectancy"
approach outlined above.
As a more practical example, consider the differences in the
approaches where a white male, age forty, suffers permanent injury
as a result of a defendant's negligence. The investigation of a life
expectancy table will demonstrate that he is expected to live thirty-
seven years. Checking the present value, it is observed that the
present value of a one dollar annuity for thirty-seven years is
$16.54. Therefore, if a jury were to use a life expectancy approach,
finding that the plaintiff were to lose $10,000 in wages annually,
they would award the plaintiff $165,400.
On the other hand, if the jury were only confronted with the
commutation table, they would simply locate the age of the plaintiff
on the table and find that a one dollar life annuity reduced to
present value was worth $15.96. Multiplying by the annual expected
loss, the jury would award $159,600. Comparing the two approaches
42 These figures are compound interest functions at a five per cent in-
terest rate. See S. KELLisON, TH THEORY OF INTEREST 6-8, 45, 146
(1970).
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reveals only a four percent difference in this particular example,
but the relative differences increase with the ages and interest rates
involved.43
This description of the differences between the annuity certain
and annuity for life is grossly oversimplified, but it will suffice to
show that the use of life expectancy tables will lead to a consistent
overstatement of expectations as compared to the commutation
approach.44 The commutation table simply produces an annuity
for life which is the most accurate estimation of future damages.
The use of the life expectancy tables in the courtroom has
probably resulted from the misconception that actuarial scientists
depend heavily on life expectancy tables. 45 Actuaries simply do not
use life expectancy tables to a great extent in their calculations:
"It is popularly believed that the expectation of life is widely used
in actuarial calculations. In reality, it is of interest to actuaries only
because it affords an index for comparing different mortality
tables."46
In addition, lawyers, like the public in general, are unaware of
the subtle although complicated differences between a life annuity
and an annuity certain. For example: "One of the persistent mis-
conceptions is that the present value of a life annuity at age x is
equal to the value of an annuity certain for a term equal to the
life expectancy at age x. ... -47
Since the relative differences between an annuity certain and a
life annuity are small, the importance of the distinction might be
termed inconsequential when contemplating future damages. How-
ever, upon reflection two important considerations reveal them-
selves. First, as a tactical matter knowledge of the differences in
43 The data for this hypothetical calculation was drawn from the 1960
Annuity Study with Projection to 1975. See generally Transactions,
Society of Actuaries, 1952 at 262-65. An increase in the age of the
plaintiff to age 60 means a 6% relative difference and an award of$124,759 instead of the correct $118,270. An increase in the discount
rate will always increase the relative error. See C. JORDAN, supra
note 32, at 174-75.
4 See note 33 supra.
45 W. MENGE & C. FIscHER, supra note 33, at 13: "The expectancy of life
is often useful in making rough analyses of problems .... It is often
supposed, however, by those unacquainted with actuarial methods
that the expectation of life is fundamental in actuarial calculations.
That this is not the case will be seen from the developments of the
succeeding chapters."
46 C. JORDAN, supra note 32, at 174.
-47 Id.
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the two approaches is important. One can imagine a situation where
a plaintiff's attorney would meticulously outline the present ap-
proach only to have the defendant's attorney declare that such an
approach led to a consistent overstatement of expected damages.
The effect on the jury could be harmful from the plaintiff's view.
The jury, aware of defendant's objection, but unaware of the small
relative differences, might reduce plaintiff's award substantially.
More importantly, the failure of the legal system to distinguish
between an annuity certain and a life annuity suggests that perhaps
the legal system is unaware of the more accurate means of measure-
ment that might be provided by the scientific community. Instead,
the system has adhered to a procedure that allows outdated and
inappropriate data to be considered while rather arbitrarily dis-
missing other considerations. It is reasonable to conclude that
future damages in American courts are not an accurate measure-
ment of expected events and that the "courts should look to the
scientific community for help in searching for a more accurate
approach.48
IV. ALTERNATIVES
Basically there are two alternatives to the present approach of
determining future damages. The present approach could be com-
pletely abandoned, or it could merely be modified.
A. ABAwoNmENT
In abandoning the lump sum payment doctrine, the courts could
devise some sort of periodic payment award similar to alimony
payments.49 The court would simply require that the negligent
defendant reimburse the plaintiff for costs incurred as a result of
the injury. Such an approach is obviously more accurate since it
could be adjusted to reflect changes in the plaintiff's condition. If
the plaintiff should miraculously recover from his injuries, the
court could halt payments. On the other hand, if complications
48 There are other considerations revealed by distinguishing between an
annuity certain and a life annuity. While the relative differences
between the two annuities is small the absolute amount could be sub-
stantial where the case involves large claims for damages. See S.
McMATc, TARiAL AN TORTS TRENDs 360 (M. Belli ed. 1969) (article
discusses the increases in the modern damage award). As a practical
matter, the life annuity approach is a simpler method of computation
since the jury is not required to refer to both a life expectancy table
and a present value table as is required to derive the annuity certain.
49 See generally Kalven, The Jury, the Law and the Personal Injury
Damage Award, 19 Onio ST. L.J. 158 (1958).
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should occur and the plaintiff should become even more disabled,
the installments could be increased.
In practical application, the periodic payment approach does
have some drawbacks as compared to the lump sum payment. The
first problem caused by adopting the periodic payment approach
relates to increased administrative costs. Clearly the courts will
be required to continually enforce such payments and may on
occasion be obliged to initiate hearings on changes in the plaintiff's
conditions. This continuing litigation might lead to substantial
costs for the parties and certainly would burden the already busy
courts.
In addition, a periodic payment strategy might prove to be
unworkable because of the economic instability of the defendant.
After the initial finding of responsibility and a judgment for the
plaintiff, the defendant might become insolvent and unable to meet
the required installments. Likewise the installment approach would
be extremely detrimental to the economic well-being of the defen-
dant, since he might be expected to radically increase the amounts
of his payments in the future. Of course, the impact of insurance
would alleviate some of the instability, however, where future
medical costs are concerned even the insurance companies have
had little success in coping with the fluctuating rates and complica-
tions.
B. MODIFICATION
The other alternative, which is more within the scope of this
comment, involves some sort of modification of the traditional
approach used by the courts in calculating future earnings.
First, the legal system should re-assess the role of the expert
testifying in regards to expected damages. Experts should be al-
lowed more freedom to form conclusions and describe the particular
needs of a plaintiff in the future.50 Because of the complex, technical
considerations and calculations, the jury needs detailed, knowledge-
able guidance.
Second, commutation tables that are up to date should be given
to the jury for consideration instead of life expectancy tables. The
commutations are easier to use since they incorporate present value
and mortality data into one table thus avoiding a referral to both
a life expectancy table and a present value table. Further, the com-
mutation table encompasses the most sophisticated methods of sta-
50 See note 10 supra.
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tistical extrapolations and results in a more accurate estimation of
future values as compared to life expectancy tables.51
Third, in deciding upon an interest rate to be applied in a
particular case, thought should be given to having financial and
economic experts establish an interest rate for use in all tort litiga-
tion. This interest rate could be adjusted when such experts agreed
that economic changes had occurred making a different rate more
realistic. This approach has the advantage of time saving since the
issue would not have to be litigated in every case and the "uniform
rate" would be accurate because it would be established by quali-
fied, impartial experts in the field of investment. Presently, every
time the issue of future damages is litigated, the question of an
applicable interest rate complicated by the inflation problem 2 is
drawn into question thus creating the possibility of two courts
simultaneously applying unequal interest rates in identical situ-
ations.
Finally, in regard to the individual plaintiff's expected earnings,
the jury should most certainly be exposed to statistics on the
matter. A good approach in the area would be first, to classify the
injured plaintiff, second, to compare his past behavior with that of
those in his class and finally to extrapolate from that data. For
example, the court in Plant v. Simmons Co.53 used such an approach
in calculating prospective damages for an injured plaintiff. First the
plaintiff was classified on the basis of occupation, education level
and race. Each of these general classifications had subsets showing
expected lifetime earnings, the present value thereof at different
interest rates and rates of productivity.54 From that data the court
compared the plaintiff's past performance to the "group" to which
he belonged. For instance, if the plaintiff was producing 72% of
average expected earnings according to the classification chart up
to the time of the accident, then he would be awarded 72% of the
prospective earnings stated on the chart.
While this approach does draw heavily from statistical data it
is rather complicated and could tend to confuse the average jury.
Furthermore, race as a valid classification is questionable in view
of court decisions against proliferating racial discrimination
51 See generally C. JoRDAN, supra note 32.
52 Peck & Hopkins, Economics and Impaired Earning Capacity in Per-
sonal Injury Cases, 44 WAsH. L. REv. 351 (1969) (article investigates
inflation and its influence on the future damage award).
53 321 F. Supp. 735 (D. Md. 1970).
54 Id. at 738.
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through the legal system.55 It is probably fair to say that some
racial groups have lower expected earnings because they are a
minority group and are discriminated against in relation to job
hiring, salaries and advancement opportunites.
The ultimate procedure for such a calculation would involve
taking the complex computation away from the jury and allowing
experts to make the estimates. The jury would be left with the
elementary fact finding determinations. 56
Under such an approach the jury would simply make notations
concerning the plaintiff's characteristics that are deemed relevant
by the experts, such as age, previous earnings, health, occupation,
sex, location. This "index of relevant characteristics" would then
be sent to a "computer center" where experts could screen the
material, feed it to a computer which would then determine future
earnings. The computer would be programmed by experts proficient
in the areas of economics, statistics and actuarial science. The pro-
gram would be designed to give proper consideration to the charac-
teristics of the plaintiff and would employ the latest mathematical
processes.57
The use of such an approach would be advantageous in several
respects. First, the jury would be relieved of burdensome calcula-
tions. Second, litigation time would be reduced since the computer
would take over a major function of the jury. Third, the use of the
computer would insure a precise estimation of a plaintiff's damage
because the computer has the capacity to store and consider vast
amounts of information quickly and accurately. Thus the computer
can focus on a plaintiff and contemplate his particular case by
utilizing the facts supplied by the jury and the program provided
55 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948): "State action, as that phrase
is understood for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, refers
to exertions of state power in all forms. And when the effect of that
action is to deny rights subject to the protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment, it is the obligation of this Court to enforce the constitu-
tional commands."
56 The value of the jury as a decision making body has been a much
debated subject. See generally M. BLOOMSTEn, VERDICT, THE JURY
SYsTEm (1968); M. GLEISsER, JURIES AND JUSTIcE (1968); L. GREEN,
WIHY TpIAL BY JURY? (1930); I. STALMASTER, WHAT PRICE JURY TRIAS?
(1931); Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 Nna. L.
Rsv. 744 (1959); With Love in Their Hearts but Reform on Their
Minds: How Trial Judges View the Civil Jury, 4 CoLmV. J. L. & Soc.
PROB. 178 (1968).
57 See Maher, Computer Proof of Economic Loss, TRIAL, July-August
1972, at 54 (example of a computer program used in determining
earning trends).
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by the experts. Finally, the computer program could easily be
altered to reflect changes in economic conditions or scientific ad-
vancements.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The calculation of future damages, especially regarding expected
earnings, involves a rational extrapolation from all of the relevant
information accumulated that relates to an injured plaintiff's past
behavior and environment. Hopefully, the estimation will represent
the actual damages incurred in the future as a result of a defendant's
negligence.
The present approach used by the legal system does not lend
itself to an accurate extrapolation. Indeed, the system seems de-
signed to prevent an accurate measurement since integrated into
the approach are conflicting, arbitrary and erroneous rules as to
what is and is not to be considered in the determination.
Designing a formula that will be more workable involves a
balancing between accuracy and ease. The measurement must be
comprehensible to the average juror, while retaining the most
sophisticated statistical manipulations to insure accuracy. The ne-
cessity of ease cannot be over-estimated since under the present
approach the courts have often become overburdened with compli-
cated materials related to expected harms, prompting one judge to
observe: "The less jurors are burdened with complicated tables and
the necessity for complex calculation, the more likely they will be
to do substantial justice."5 8
To solve the dilemma encountered in the calculation of prospec-
tive harms, the legal system should look to the scientific community
for guidance in creating an improved approach. Scientists do have
the ability and knowlege necessary to create an approach that
could be equitable and accurate. At the very least, the legal system
must give more attention to damages and their relative importance.
I suggest that the crucial controversy in personal injury torts to-
day is not in the area of liability but of damages.... Questions of
damages-and particularly their magnitude-do not lend them-
selves so easily to discourse.... Judges consign them uneasily tojuries with a minimum of guidance, occasionally observing loosely
that there are no rules for assessing damages in personal injury
cases.59
Gregory Searson '73
58 Moore v. Leininger, 299 Pa. 380, 385, 149 A. 662, 664 (1930).
59 Jaffe, Damages For Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance, 18 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROB. 219, 221 (1953).
